Christina Harward, Angelica Evans, Grace Mappes, Karolina Hird, and Frederick W. Kagan
April 29, 2024, 6:45pm ET
Click here
to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This
map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here
to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a
computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this
data-heavy tool.
Click here
to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian
invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain
map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will
update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note:
The data cut-off for this product was 12:30pm ET on April 29. ISW will
cover subsequent reports in the April 30 Russian Offensive Campaign
Assessment.
Russian forces secured
additional marginal tactical gains northwest and southwest of Avdiivka
as of April 29, but have not made significant advances in the Avdiivka
direction over the last 24 hours. Geolocated footage published
on April 28 and 29 indicates that Russian forces advanced in western and
northeastern Ocheretyne (northwest of Avdiivka), along the rail line to
the northwestern outskirts of Ocheretyne, and in Netaylove (southwest
of Avdiivka).[1]
Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces also advanced northwest
of Ocheretyne towards Novooleksandrivka in an area 1.2 kilometers wide
and 1.7 kilometers deep.[2]
A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced 400–450
meters west of the C051801 (Orlivka-Netaylove) highway between Netaylove
and Umanske (west of Avdiivka).[3]
ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claimed Russian
advances, however. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) officially
stated that Russian forces seized Semenivka (west of Avdiivka) following
Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi’s April
28 statement that Ukrainian forces withdrew from the settlement.[4]
Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are conducting clearing
operations in Berdychi (west of Avdiivka), and Ocheretyne,
Novokalynove, and Keramik (both northwest of Avdiivka and east of
Ocheretyne).[5]
Fighting also continued northwest of Avdiivka near Kalynove,
Arkhanhelske, Novobakhmutivka, Solovyove, Sokil, Novopokrovske, and
Novoselivka Persha; and west of Avdiivka near Orlivka and Umanske.[6]
Russian
forces have the opportunity to choose among multiple tactical
directions for future offensive drives near Avdiivka, but it remains
unclear where they will focus their efforts in the near future.
Russian milbloggers speculated about which objectives Russian forces
may pursue northwest of Avdiivka but offered no clear consensus. Several
prominent milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are conducting
offensive operations near Keramik to advance towards Arkhanhelske but
are also trying to advance west from the Ocheretyne area towards Sokil
and southwest towards the Novoprokovske-Novoselivka Persha line.[7]
ISW continues to assess that the continued Russian stabilization of
their salient northwest of Avdiivka presents the Russian command with a
choice of either continuing to push west towards its
reported operational objective in Pokrovsk or trying to drive northwards
to conduct possible complementary offensive operations with the Russian
effort around Chasiv Yar.[8]
Investigations
by both Ukrainian news agencies and Russian opposition outlets suggest
that Russia is denying the legal guardians of forcibly deported and
adopted Ukrainian children the ability to repatriate these children,
further undermining the Kremlin’s claims that the deportation and
adoption of Ukrainian children is a necessary humanitarian endeavor. BBC Panorama and Russian opposition outlet Vazhnye Istorii
published investigations in November 2023 that detailed how “A Just
Russia” Party leader Sergey Mironov and his wife Inna Varlamova deported
a ten-month girl and a two-year old boy from an orphanage in Kherson
Oblast in fall 2022.[9]
Mironov and Varlamova adopted the girl and changed her name, surname,
and birthplace on her new Russian birth certificate, and the whereabouts
of the boy remain unknown. Ukrainian outlet TSN posted an
investigation on April 28, 2024, that further details the circumstances
of Mironov’s adoption of the girl and includes footage of Mironov and
his wife attending a baptism for the child.[10] TSN alleged
that Mironov and Varlamova brought both the girl and the boy to Moscow
Oblast, but that the boy was ill and that Mironov and Varlamova
abandoned him, which is why his whereabouts remain unknown.[11]
TSN also reported that the Ukrainian Ombudsman’s Office found that the
girl, who is now nearly three years old, actually has a legal guardian
and a younger sister living in Greece and noted that the girls’ guardian
is asking for her return.[12] Russian opposition outlet TV Dozhd
similarly reported on April 27 that a Russian woman adopted a deported
six-year-old boy from occupied Donetsk Oblast and changed his name and
surname, which made it harder for journalists and the boy’s family to
find him.[13] TV Dozhd noted
that the boy’s sixteen-year-old sister attempted to find him and gain
custody through the Russian court system, which denied her right to
guardianship.[14]
The
practice of changing the names and birthplaces of deported Ukrainian
children and adopting them into Russian families is likely intended to
erase the paper-trail of the circumstances of their deportations and
their true identities to make it more challenging for the Ukrainian
government or their guardians to find or repatriate them. Russian
authorities, including Russian President Vladimir Putin and
Kremlin-appointed Commissioner on Children’s Rights Maria Lvova-Belova,
frequently try to justify the deportation and adoption of Ukrainian
children on humanitarian grounds and cloak what is ultimately part of a
genocidal enterprise to destroy Ukrainian identity in the guise of
rescuing orphaned Ukrainian children.[15]
Reports that some of these children have legal guardians who are asking
for their return undermines the Russian effort to claim that the
deportation of Ukrainian children is a humanitarian necessity and
highlights the fact that Russian authorities seem intent on covering
their tracks to make deported children harder to find and return to
Ukraine.
NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg
stated during an unexpected visit to Kyiv on April 29 that Ukraine’s
Western allies must provide long-term, predictable military assistance
to Ukraine and signal to the Kremlin that Russia cannot “wait out”
Western support for Ukraine.[16] Stoltenberg
stated during a press conference with Ukrainian President Volodymyr
Zelensky that serious delays in Western military support have resulted
in serious battlefield consequences. Stoltenberg noted that Ukrainian
forces have been “outgunned” and have downed fewer Russian missiles over
the last several months due to materiel shortages and that Russian
forces are currently advancing in several areas of the frontline due to
manpower and material shortages. Stoltenberg stated that he expects
Ukraine’s Western allies to soon announce additional unspecified
military assistance commitments and stressed that NATO member states
need to make “major,” multi-year financial commitments to support
Ukraine and emphasize to Moscow that Russia cannot win by “wait[ing]
out” Western support for Ukraine. Zelensky noted during the press
conference that NATO and Ukraine continue to work towards further
interoperability of their forces, and Stoltenberg expressed confidence
in Ukraine’s eventual accession to NATO.[17]
The
consistent provision of key Western systems to Ukraine will play a
critical role in Russia’s prospects in 2024 and beyond, as well as in
Ukraine’s ability to contest the theater-wide initiative, conduct future
counteroffensive operations, and liberate Ukrainian territory from
Russian occupation.[18]
US and European failures to sustain the timely provision of critical
systems to Ukraine will not only continue to constrain Ukraine’s ability
to plan and wage offensive and defensive operations, but also signal
weakness and hesitancy in Western support for Ukraine to the Kremlin.
These signals in turn strengthen the Kremlin’s belief that it can “wait
out” Western support for Ukraine and achieve its objectives of
destroying Ukrainian statehood and subjugating the Ukrainian people
after the West abandons Ukraine thereby encouraging Putin to persist in
his aggression. Recent Kremlin information operations targeting the West
have specifically emphasized the idea that Russia can and will outlast
Western military assistance to Ukraine and Ukraine’s will and ability to
defend itself.[19]
The
Kremlin is pursuing a hybrid campaign directly targeting NATO states,
including using GPS jamming and sabotaging military logistics in NATO
members’ territory. Financial Times (FT) reported on
April 29 that Baltic ministers are warning that Russia is behind recent
cases of GPS jamming that have interfered with commercial navigation
signals and forced two Finnair flights to turn back in the middle of
flights from Helsinki to Tartu in the past week.[20] FT estimated that GPS jamming has affected “tens of thousands” of civilian flights in recent months. UK outlet the Sun
also reported on April 23 that suspected Russian GPS jamming impacted
over three thousand UK civilian flights over the Baltic region, and
British officials also believe that Russia jammed the satellite signal
of a Royal Air Force jet that was transporting British Defense Secretary
Grant Shapps back to the UK from Poland in March.[21] Estonian Foreign Minister Margus Tsakhna told FT that Estonia considers recent GPS jamming instances “part of Russia’s hostile activities” and a “hybrid attack.”[22]
FT noted that there are three suspected sources — Russian electronic
warfare (EW) assets in Kaliningrad; another source in Russia causing GPS
disturbances in Estonia and Finland; and a third source that is active
farther north and impacting the northern parts of Norway and Finland.[23]
An open-source intelligence account focusing on GPS jamming in the
Baltic region assessed that the GPS jammer affecting the Estonian
flights is in Russia roughly halfway between St. Petersburg and Narva,
Estonia.[24] ISW has observed widespread GPS disruptions across Poland and the Baltics since late December 2023.[25]
Russian investigative outlet The Insider
published a report on April 29 detailing how agents of the Russian
General Staff’s Main Directorate (GRU) established a long-term presence
in the Czech Republic and Greece to help agents of notorious GRU Unit
29155 — which previously conducted high-level assassination attempts
with nerve agents and is reportedly responsible for nonlethal energy or
acoustic attacks against US diplomatic, military, and intelligence
personnel — conduct sabotage operations in European NATO states.[26] The Insider
reported that two agents with Russian citizenship in particular helped
GRU Unit 29155 facilitate attacks against ammunition depots in the Czech
Republic and Bulgaria, including destroying 150 tons of ammunition and
killing two people in the Czech Republic in 2014, by providing
intelligence about weapons shipments and a safehouse for GRU agents.[27] The Insider
also implicated the two Russian agents in helping facilitate GRU Unit
29155’s first assassination attempt against the head of the Bulgarian
arms company EMCO, Emilian Gebrev, who provided ammunition to Ukraine in
2014. The Insider reported that Unit 29155 also attempted to
poison Gebrev in 2015 after the first assassination attempt failed but
did not implicate the other Russian agents in facilitating the second
attack.[28]
The Kremlin has been waging this hybrid campaign to destabilize NATO
for the past decade through these various assassination attempts,
logistics sabotage, and allegedly acoustic and energy attacks against
government personnel.[29] The recent GPS jamming incidents indicate that the Kremlin likely intends to continue this campaign.
Telegram
recently temporarily blocked chatbots meant to facilitate civilian
reports on Russian military activity to official Ukrainian channels,
including some channels run by Ukrainian security services. Telegram
blocked the bots of Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate
(GUR), Security Service (SBU), and Ministry of Digital Development as
well as chatbots associated with the Ukrainian channel Crimean Wind and the Freedom of Russia Legion on August 27 and 28.[30]
Ukraine’s Center for Strategic Communications and Information Security
reported on April 29 that Telegram had restored a number of channels’
chatbots, including those belonging to the GUR and SBU.[31] Reuters reported
that a Telegram spokesperson stated that Telegram had “temporarily
disabled” the bots due to a “false positive” but had since reinstated
them.[32]
Telegram chatbots allow Telegram users to submit comments or questions
to the administrators of certain Telegram channels, and Ukrainian
authorities have used these chatbots to allow Ukrainians to submit
questions or tips about Russia’s war effort directly to the appropriate
Ukrainian agencies.[33]
Telegram founder Pavel Durov stated on April 24 that Telegram bans
accounts and bots that collect information for military intelligence
purposes and that Apple had sent Telegram requests to make unspecified
changes to the platform for Telegram users using Ukrainian SIM cards.[34]
Russian milbloggers initially expressed enthusiasm after reports
emerged about Telegram banning the Ukrainian bots, and some later
criticized Telegram for reversing the decision.[35]
The Kremlin has previously pressured Telegram to censor certain
content, including after the March 22 Crocus City Hall attack, but the
Kremlin’s possible role in the recent bot bans is unclear at this time.[36]
Key Takeaways:
- Russian
forces secured additional marginal tactical gains northwest and
southwest of Avdiivka as of April 29, but have not made significant
advances in the Avdiivka direction over the last 24 hours.
- Russian
forces have the opportunity to choose among multiple tactical
directions for future offensive drives near Avdiivka, but it remains
unclear where they will focus their efforts in the near future.
- Investigations
by both Ukrainian news agencies and Russian opposition outlets suggest
that Russia is denying the legal guardians of forcibly deported and
adopted Ukrainian children the ability to repatriate these children,
further undermining the Kremlin’s claims that the deportation and
adoption of Ukrainian children is a necessary humanitarian endeavor.
- NATO
Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg stated during an unexpected visit to
Kyiv on April 29 that Ukraine’s Western allies must provide long-term,
predictable military assistance to Ukraine and signal to the Kremlin
that Russia cannot “wait out” Western support for Ukraine.
- The
Kremlin is pursuing a hybrid campaign directly targeting NATO states,
including using GPS jamming and sabotaging military logistics in NATO
members’ territory.
- Telegram recently
temporarily blocked chatbots meant to facilitate civilian reports on
Russian military activity to official Ukrainian channels, including some
channels run by Ukrainian security services.
- Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Avdiivka and Donetsk City.
- Ukrainian
officials continue to report that Russian authorities are coercing
Ukrainians in occupied Ukraine to join the Russian military.
We
do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities
are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the
military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue
to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on
the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on
combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations
of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes
against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
- Russian
Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast
and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern
Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Russian Technological Adaptations
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
- Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
- Russian Information Operations and Narratives
- Significant Activity in Belarus
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast
(Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push
westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Satellite
imagery taken on April 27 shows that Russia is building an airfield
that will likely be used for military purposes in Belgorod Oblast about
75 kilometers from the Ukrainian border area.[37]
The imagery shows the construction of an 1,800-meter-long runway and
surrounding infrastructure about nine kilometers west of Alekseevka,
Belgorod Oblast, between July 2023 and April 2024. Radio Liberty’s
Russian service noted that the length of the runway suggests that
Russian forces intend to operate Il-76 military transport aircraft from
the new airbase.[38]
Russian
forces continued offensive operations along the Svatove-Kreminna line
on April 29, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline.
Ukrainian and Russian sources reported continued fighting northwest of
Svatove near Berestove and Stelmakhivka; southwest of Svatove near
Tverdohlibove, Kopanky, Novoserhiivka, Makiivka, and Nevske; west of
Kreminna near Terny and south of Zarichne; southwest of Kreminna in the
Serebryanske forest area; and south of Kreminna near Bilohorivka.[39]
Russian milbloggers continued to disagree over the status of Kyslivka
(northwest of Svatove), which some Russian sources claimed that Russian
forces have seized in recent days, and one milblogger noted that Russian
forces have only raised a flag in southern Kyslivka and do not yet
control the northern part of the settlement.[40]
A prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian forces
continued offensive operations towards Makiivka and gained a foothold on
the eastern outskirts of the settlement, although ISW has not yet
observed visual confirmation of Russian forces operating on the
outskirts of Makiivka.[41]
Ukrainian Kharkiv Oblast Head Oleh Synehubov reported on April 29 that
Russian forces have resumed offensive operations in the Kupyansk and
Lyman directions and stated that the Russian command is planning to
accumulate forces along the Kharkiv-Belgorod Oblast border, but that it
is too early to forecast if and when Russian forces may open a new front
in this area.[42]
A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of Russia’s Western and
Northern Grouping of Forces are intensifying combat activity, including
air and artillery strikes, in the Kharkiv City direction.[43]
Ukrainian officials have continuously warned that Russian forces may
launch an offensive operation against Kharkiv City in summer 2024,
although ISW assesses that Russian forces currently lack the forces
necessary to seize Ukraine’s second largest city.[44]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Positional
engagements continued in the Siversk direction northeast of Bakhmut on
April 29, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this
area. Positional engagements continued east of Siversk near
Verkhnokamyanske; southeast of Siversk near Vyimka; and south of Siversk
near Rozdolivka.[45]
Elements of the Russian 2nd Artillery Brigade and the “GORB” detachment
(both of the 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps [LNR AC]) are
reportedly operating near Spirne (southeast of Siversk).[46]
Fighting
continued near Chasiv Yar on April 29, but there were no confirmed
changes to the frontline in this area. Geolocated footage published on
April 28 shows that Ukrainian forces recently repelled a roughly
reinforced platoon-sized Russian mechanized assault north of
Klishchiivka (southeast of Chasiv Yar).[47]
Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are using “turtle”
armored vehicles – armored vehicles with metal sheets welded on their
sides to protect against drone strikes – in combat operations near
Chasiv Yar after having recently used similar vehicle protection systems
fitted on tanks west of Donetsk City near Krasnohorivka.[48]
Fighting continued north of Chasiv Yar near Hryhorivka; near the Novyi
Microraion (eastern Chasiv Yar); east of Chasiv Yar near Ivanivske;
southeast of Chasiv Yar near Klishchiivka and Andriivka; and south of
Chasiv Yar near Pivdenne and Niu York.[49]
The deputy commander of a Ukrainian unit operating near Chasiv Yar
stated that Ukrainian and Russian forces each control about 50 percent
of Ivanivske and that Ukrainian and Russian forces are conducting
attacks in the settlement in alternating waves.[50]
The deputy commander stated that Russian forces are interested in
taking Ivanivske, which is located in a geographical lowland, to advance
to Chasiv Yar.
See topline text for updates on the situation in the Avdiivka direction.
Russian
forces recently made confirmed advances west of Donetsk City amid
continued fighting west and southwest of Donetsk City on April 29.
Geolocated footage published on April 29 indicates that Russian forces
advanced east of Krasnohorivka (west of Donetsk City).[51]
Additional geolocated footage published on April 29 of a roughly
reinforced platoon-sized Russian mechanized assault indicates that
Russian forces advanced within Krasnohorivka, and Russian milbloggers
claimed that protective metal sheets on the Russian “turtle” tanks in
the assault successfully protected against Ukrainian drone strikes.[52]
A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also advanced near
Novomykhailivka (southwest of Donetsk City), but ISW has not observed
visual confirmation of this claim.[53] Fighting continued west of Donetsk City near Heorhiivka and Krasnohorivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Novomykhailivka.[54]
Positional
engagements continued in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on
April 29, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this
area. Positional engagements continued northeast of Vuhledar near
Vodyane; southeast of Velyka Novosilka near Novodarivka; and south of
Velyka Novosilka near Urozhaine and Staromayorske.[55]
A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Mykilske
(southeast of Vuhledar), up to 200 meters near Urozhaine, and up to 700
meters near Staromayorske, but ISW has not observed visual confirmation
of these claims. Elements of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade
(29th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) and the
14th Spetsnaz Brigade (subordinate to the Russian General Staff’s Main
Intelligence Directorate) are reportedly operating near Vuhledar.[56]
Elements of the Russian 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet,
EMD) are reportedly operating near Shevchenko (southeast of Velyka
Novosilka), and elements of the 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army
(Russian Aerospace Forces and EMD) are reportedly operating near
Urozhaine.[57]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)
Positional
fighting continued in western Zaporizhia Oblast near Robotyne and
Verbove (east of Robotyne) on April 29, but there were no changes to the
frontline.[58]
Elements of the Russian 108th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV
Division), 291st Guards Artillery Brigade (58th Combined Arms Army
[CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]), and 42nd Motorized Rifle
Division (58th CAA) are reportedly operating near Robotyne. [59]
Positional
fighting continued in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast near Krynky on
April 29, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline.[60] Elements of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet [BSF]) are reportedly fighting in Krynky.[61]
Ukrainian
Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro
Pletenchuk stated on April 29 that Russian authorities have stopped
transporting fuel across the Kerch Strait railway bridge for the past
month due to the threat of a Ukrainian strike igniting the fuel as it
crossed the bridge, possibly destroying the bridge.[62]
Pletenchuk emphasized that the Kerch Strait Bridge - likely referring
to both the road and railway bridges - do not provide essential Russian
military logistics. Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) Head Vasyl Malyuk
stated in March 2024 that Russian forces have stopped using the Kerch
Strait railway bridge for military and logistics transport.[63]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)
Russian
forces conducted limited missile and guided glide bomb strikes against
Kharkiv City and areas of southern Ukraine on April 29. Ukrainian outlet
Suspilne reported that there were two explosions in Kharkiv
City following Russian guided glide bomb and anti-aircraft missile
strikes on the Kyivskyi raion in northern Kharkiv City.[64]
Russian forces also launched unspecified missiles at Zaporizhzhia City
and Odesa City, damaging civilian and residential infrastructure in
Odesa City.[65]
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)
Ukrainian
officials continue to report that Russian authorities are coercing
Ukrainians in occupied Ukraine to join the Russian military. The Office
of the Ukrainian Presidential Representation in Crimea reported that
authorities have recorded the burial of at least 784 Russian soldiers
likely within the past week presumably in occupied Crimea and stated
that at least 593 of these soldiers were Ukrainian citizens.[66]
The Office of the Ukrainian Presidential Representation in Crimea also
reported that Ukrainian forces have recently taken 42 Russian servicemen
as prisoners-of-war (POWs) who are from Crimea, most of whom are likely
Ukrainian citizens.[67]
The representative’s office reported that Russian authorities are also
attempting to recruit doctors and other medical staff in civilian
hospitals to sign contracts with the Russian military.[68]
The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that Russian occupation
authorities in southern Ukraine are forming conscription commissions to
increase recruitment rates in occupied Ukraine for Russia’s spring
conscription cycle in April-July 2024.[69]
Ukrainian Mariupol Mayoral Advisor Petro Andryushchenko posted images
on April 29 of the Russian military conducting a recruitment drive in
Freedom Square in occupied Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast.[70]
The
Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues to award Russian military
units for their service in Ukraine. Russian Defense Minister Sergei
Shoigu awarded the Russian 11th Engineering Brigade (Southern Military
District [SMD]) for building fortifications in the Lysychansk,
Soledar-Bakhmut, Avdiivka, Zaporizhia and Kakhovka directions; the 50th
Railway Brigade (5th Territorial Command, Russian Railway Forces) for
strengthening Russian border defenses in Bryansk Oblast and operating
the Baikal-Amur Railway; the 90th Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade (49th
Combined Arms Army [CAA], SMD) for operating in southern Ukraine; and
the 56th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) for operations near
Robotyne.[71]
Such state awards are likely meant in part to incentivize military
recruitment by advertising benefits accrued to awarded servicemembers.
Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)
Nothing significant to report.
Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts
(Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become
more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international
partners)
Ukraine continues efforts to expand
its domestic defense industry and increase joint production with its
Western allies to support the war effort. Ukrainian President Volodymyr
Zelensky stated on April 25 that Ukrainian defense industrial companies
are producing unspecified weapons and equipment at a higher rate than
the Ukrainian government can fund and that Ukrainian officials are
working to encourage foreign investment to fund additional projects.[72]
Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov announced on April 23 that
Ukraine issued domestically produced armored vehicles to a Ukrainian
unit.[73]
Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Yuriy Dzhygyr stated that roughly
half of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) contracts for weapons
and military equipment are with Ukrainian manufacturers.[74]
Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba stated on April 26 that
Ukraine and Latvia have agreed to increase joint drone production.[75]
Ukraine's
Western allies continue to promise and provide additional military
assistance to Ukraine. Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal met with
Australian Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister Richard Marles on
April 27 and announced that Australia will transfer 50 million AUD
($32.8 million) in ground-to-air MANPADS munitions, over 30 million AUD
($19.69 million) to Ukraine’s drone coalition, and roughly 20 million
AUD ($13,1 million) for other military needs.[76]
Australia will also transfer an unspecified number of air-to-ground
munitions to Ukraine. Canadian Defense Minister William Blair announced
on April 26 that Canada will provide three million CAD (roughly $2.2
million) for domestic drone production in Ukraine, an additional 13
million CAD ($9.5 million) to the Czech ammunition initiative for
Ukraine, and an additional 100 Skyranger drones to Ukraine.[77]
The Spanish MoD stated that it will deliver an unspecified number of
155mm and 120mm artillery shells and air defense missiles to Ukraine in
the coming months and will also deliver small arms, logistics vehicles,
armored infantry fighting vehicles, anti-tank weapons, and artillery
systems in the next two months.[78]
The Danish MoD announced on April 25 that the Danish parliament and
Cabinet of Ministers agreed to increase Denmark’s military assistance to
Ukraine by 4.4 billion Danish kroner ($632.27 million) in 2024.[79]
The Lithuanian MoD reported on April 23 that Lithuania recently
provided an unspecified number of M577 armored personnel carriers to
Ukraine.[80]
Lithuanian Defense Minister Laurynas Kasčiūnas stated that Lithuania is
also considering providing Ukraine with unspecified radar systems in
the near future.[81]
European Union (EU) High Commissioner Josep Borrell announced that the
Czech ammunition initiative should begin deliveries of artillery shells
to Ukraine at the end of May or beginning of June.[82]
Belgian
Prime Minister Alexander De Croo, Defense Minister Ludivine Dedonder,
and the Belgian Council of Ministers stated on April 26 that Belgium
will send the first F-16 aircraft to Ukraine sometime in 2024 and will
do everything possible to deliver them before the end of the year.[83]
Belgian officials added that Belgium will also allocate an additional
200 million euros ($214.3 million) to the German-led defense aid
coalition and will provide additional air defense missiles to Ukraine.[84]
Activities in Russian-occupied areas
(Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed
areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural,
economic, military, and governance systems)
ISW is not publishing coverage of Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine today.
Russian Information Operations and Narratives
Ukrainian
Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Nazer
Voloshyn stated on April 29 that the Kremlin is conducting an
information operation aimed at creating panic and fear among Ukrainians
about the possibility of a future Russian offensive operation against
Sumy Oblast.[85]
Voloshyn stated that Ukrainian forces are monitoring the Russian force
grouping across the Russian-Ukrainian border near Sumy Oblast and that
the current Russian grouping in the area poses no threat to Ukraine.
Sumy Oblast Military Administration Head Volodymyr Artyuk warned on
March 12 about the same Russian information operation and reported that
Ukrainian forces have not observed any Russian strike groups forming
along the Russian-Ukrainian border.[86]
Significant activity in Belarus
(Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and
further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner
Group activity in Belarus)
Belarusian President
Alexander Lukashenko signed Belarus’ annual decree on the conscription
of reserve officers into the Belarusian armed forces and border service
on April 29.[87]
The decree provides for the planned annual conscription of male
citizens of Belarus under the age of 27 who have completed reserve
officer training and are enrolled in the Belarusian reserves.[88]
Note:
ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only
publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian,
Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as
commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as
the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided
in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://twitter.com/PuenteUribarri/status/1784505159877275962; https://twitter.com/Bielitzling/status/1784526705643651395; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/207; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/5285 ; https://twitter.com/Bielitzling/status/1784682628773265502; https://twitter.com/Bielitzling/status/1784682632321609831; https://t.me/osirskiy/671; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/14297; https://twitter.com/spatialgrounds/status/1784873550467240042; https://twitter.com/spatialgrounds/status/1784873464328827118; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/5290 ;
[2] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/10147 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/10144 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/67075 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/26646 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/22242
[3] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/10139
[4] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-28-2024 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/38061
[5] https://t.me/wargonzo/19630 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/121865 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/14334
[6] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Hj8kUWxmnKavPQbTrxeoNaidZJGUdrpNXXSNsqd94nW58qPuUCUkPjLvFZfmjawwl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid021veCWWKwULc3wtHeaQpiNMmYE3Xq3orUjQPcEGVnChMYFHuuPHPMxfMot3vuDAjGl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0D36GUSH5NjkwoqrLny81Lnyc5xXs73QuXQRKCqZDNPZSVwsBfMAakdhFshAtntqil ; https://t.me/mod_russia/38061
[7] https://t.me/rybar/59587 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/41130 ; https://t.me/rybar/59620 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/14334
[8] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-28-2024
[9] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-67488646; https://storage.googleapis.com/istories/stories/2023/11/23/mironov-i-deti/index.html
[10] https://tsn
dot
ua/ru/exclusive/detey-iz-hersona-pohitil-izvestnyy-rossiyskiy-politik-neizvestnye-do-sih-por-detali-i-unikalnye-kadry-voennogo-prestupleniya-rf-2567403.html
[11] https://kyivindependent.com/russian-mp-wife-planned-to-adopt-ukrainian-child/
[12] https://t.me/istories_media/6183 ; https://t.me/bbcrussian/64321
[13] https://t.me/tvrain/77776; https://t.me/tvrain/77781; https://youtu.be/l5DOlA81RO8; https://t.me/svobodnieslova/4790
[14] https://t.me/tvrain/77781
[15] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/24-210-01%20ISW%20Occupation%20playbook.pdf
[16] https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_225160.htm ; https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_225154.htm
[17] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/04/29/ukrayina-ta-nato-dosyagly-najvyshhogo-rivnya-vidnosyn-za-chas-nezalezhnosti-prezydent/; https://www.facebook.com/zelenskyy.official/posts/pfbid02EhrJAn5EUkxCCqzNVPABFkRbgdhEiYuu2MTgZNaK15ufJahAgthHXie4bMVBU6Pyl ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/04/29/yens-stoltenberg-zaprosyv-volodymyra-zelenskogo-na-samit-nato-u-vashyngtoni/ ; https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_225160.htm ; https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_225154.htm
[18] https://isw.pub/UkrWar032824
[19] https://isw.pub/UkrWar041524 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar022324 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021324
[20] https://www.ft.com/content/37776b16-0b92-4a23-9f90-199d45d955c3
[21] https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/27456029/russia-hack-british-flights-air-safety-threat/; https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/russia-electronic-attack-grant-shapps-plane-qltjc6gqg
[22] https://www.ft.com/content/37776b16-0b92-4a23-9f90-199d45d955c3
[23] https://www.ft.com/content/37776b16-0b92-4a23-9f90-199d45d955c3
[24] https://twitter.com/auonsson/status/1785045420185473079; https://twitter.com/auonsson/status/1785045423519867316; https://twitter.com/auonsson/status/1785045427093491918
[25] https://isw.pub/UkrWar011824
[26] https://theins dot press/politika/271203
[27] https://theins dot press/politika/241241
[28] https://theins dot press/politika/241432
[29] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-15-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/April%201%20Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20Assessment%20PDF_0.pdf
[30] https://t.me/DIUkraine/3753 ; https://t.me/astrapress/54248; https://t.me/Crimeanwind/58417 ; https://www.unian dot net/war/blokuvannya-telegram-zablokovano-ukrajinski-kanali-12619800.html; https://t.me/DIUkraine/3753
[31] https://www.facebook.com/StratcomCentreUA/posts/758142666469717?ref=embed_post
[32] https://www.reuters.com/technology/ukraine-spy-agency-says-telegram-platform-blocks-its-key-bots-2024-04-29/
[33] https://www.reuters.com/technology/ukraine-spy-agency-says-telegram-platform-blocks-its-key-bots-2024-04-29/
[34] https://t.me/durov/266 ; https://www.reuters.com/technology/ukraine-spy-agency-says-telegram-platform-blocks-its-key-bots-2024-04-29/
[35] https://t.me/rybar/59598 ; https://t.me/rybar/59617 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/8200; https://t.me/voin_dv/8198
[36] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-17-2024; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032924
[37] https://twitter.com/RedIntelPanda/status/1784761855417762275; https://twitter.com/RedIntelPanda/status/1784761860748693847; https://twitter.com/RedIntelPanda/status/1784762648988422297; https://twitter.com/RedIntelPanda/status/1784764929989280038; https://twitter.com/RedIntelPanda/status/1784765467330048259; https://t.me/astrapress/54277; https://t.me/astrapress/54266 ; https://t.me/astrapress/54265; https://t.me/radiosvoboda/60352
[38] https://t.me/radiosvoboda/60352; https://twitter.com/kromark/status/1784925646671564968
[39] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Hj8kUWxmnKavPQbTrxeoNaidZJGUdrpNXXSNsqd94nW58qPuUCUkPjLvFZfmjawwl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid021veCWWKwULc3wtHeaQpiNMmYE3Xq3orUjQPcEGVnChMYFHuuPHPMxfMot3vuDAjGl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0D36GUSH5NjkwoqrLny81Lnyc5xXs73QuXQRKCqZDNPZSVwsBfMAakdhFshAtntqil; https://t.me/synegubov/9248; https://t.me/mod_russia/38061
[40] https://t.me/dva_majors/41130; https://t.me/dva_majors/41114; https://t.me/motopatriot/22223
[41] https://t.me/rybar/59587
[42] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/04/29/oleg-synyegubov-shhodo-sytuacziyi-na-harkivshhyni-pro-novi-liniyi-frontu-govoryty-zarano/
[43] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/10356; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/10358
[44] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042824; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041924
[45] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Hj8kUWxmnKavPQbTrxeoNaidZJGUdrpNXXSNsqd94nW58qPuUCUkPjLvFZfmjawwl ;https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid021veCWWKwULc3wtHeaQpiNMmYE3Xq3orUjQPcEGVnChMYFHuuPHPMxfMot3vuDAjGl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0D36GUSH5NjkwoqrLny81Lnyc5xXs73QuXQRKCqZDNPZSVwsBfMAakdhFshAtntqil
[46] https://t.me/sons_fatherland/14051 ; https://t.me/sons_fatherland/14027
[47] https://t.me/The_life_of_Predova/2241; https://twitter.com/EjShahid/status/1784955707046973618; https://twitter.com/EjShahid/status/1784955603472802240 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/67085; https://t.me/milinfolive/121272
[48] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-24-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-17-2024 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/41166 ; https://t.me/sashakots/46381 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/10150 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/121881
[49] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Hj8kUWxmnKavPQbTrxeoNaidZJGUdrpNXXSNsqd94nW58qPuUCUkPjLvFZfmjawwl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid021veCWWKwULc3wtHeaQpiNMmYE3Xq3orUjQPcEGVnChMYFHuuPHPMxfMot3vuDAjGl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0D36GUSH5NjkwoqrLny81Lnyc5xXs73QuXQRKCqZDNPZSVwsBfMAakdhFshAtntqil ; https://t.me/mod_russia/38047 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/14334 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/38061
[50] https://www.pravda dot com.ua/articles/2024/04/29/7453396/
[51] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/211; https://twitter.com/franfran2424/status/1784912350010622200; https://twitter.com/fulzint/status/1784881645293826382; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/5292 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/211; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/5293
[52] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/121864; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/5294 ; https://t.me/rybar/59624
[53] https://t.me/z_arhiv/26645
[54] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Hj8kUWxmnKavPQbTrxeoNaidZJGUdrpNXXSNsqd94nW58qPuUCUkPjLvFZfmjawwl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid021veCWWKwULc3wtHeaQpiNMmYE3Xq3orUjQPcEGVnChMYFHuuPHPMxfMot3vuDAjGl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0D36GUSH5NjkwoqrLny81Lnyc5xXs73QuXQRKCqZDNPZSVwsBfMAakdhFshAtntqil ; https://t.me/rybar/59587 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/19630
[55] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Hj8kUWxmnKavPQbTrxeoNaidZJGUdrpNXXSNsqd94nW58qPuUCUkPjLvFZfmjawwl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid021veCWWKwULc3wtHeaQpiNMmYE3Xq3orUjQPcEGVnChMYFHuuPHPMxfMot3vuDAjGl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0D36GUSH5NjkwoqrLny81Lnyc5xXs73QuXQRKCqZDNPZSVwsBfMAakdhFshAtntqil ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/8728 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/38061
[56] https://t.me/voin_dv/8197 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/8207
[57] https://t.me/voin_dv/8199 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/8201
[58] https://t.me/wargonzo/19628; https://t.me/wargonzo/19630
[59] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/121869; https://t.me/mod_russia/38064 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/67090 (Robotyne)
[60]
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid021veCWWKwULc3wtHeaQpiNMmYE3Xq3orUjQPcEGVnChMYFHuuPHPMxfMot3vuDAjGl;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0D36GUSH5NjkwoqrLny81Lnyc5xXs73QuXQRKCqZDNPZSVwsBfMAakdhFshAtntqil;
https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/8728; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Hj8kUWxmnKavPQbTrxeoNaidZJGUdrpNXXSNsqd94nW58qPuUCUkPjLvFZfmjawwl; https://t.me/wargonzo/19628;
[61] https://t.me/dva_majors/41164; https://t.me/dva_majors/41172 (Krynky)
[62]
https://suspilne dot
media/734167-rosia-namagaetsa-prorvati-liniu-frontu-u-nimeccini-vbili-poperedno-dvoh-vijskovih-zsu-796-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1714387731&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps;
https://armyinform dot
com.ua/2024/04/29/absolyutno-zajva-sporuda-u-sylah-oborony-nazvaly-krymskyj-mist-zakonnoyu-czillyu/
[63] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-26-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-29-2024
[64] https://suspilne
dot
media/kharkiv/723085-rosia-atakuvala-harkiv-29-kvitna-prolunali-vibuhi-pisla-poperedzenna-povitranih-sil-pro-puski-kabiv/;
https://t.me/synegubov/9252
[65] https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/6844; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/28439 ; https://t.me/odeskaODA/5006; https://armyinform.com.= dot ua/2024/04/29/vnaslidok-udaru-po-odesi-poraneno-vosmero-lyudej/
[66] https://www.facebook.com/ppu.gov.ua/posts/pfbid02EPWBHxvCMM3uv7KK1fTcwPHep5asE1J6FLQBDj4Uidqd7z4mBmN3whC85jysSamLl
[67] https://www.facebook.com/ppu.gov.ua/posts/pfbid02EPWBHxvCMM3uv7KK1fTcwPHep5asE1J6FLQBDj4Uidqd7z4mBmN3whC85jysSamLl
[68] https://www.facebook.com/ppu.gov.ua/posts/pfbid02EPWBHxvCMM3uv7KK1fTcwPHep5asE1J6FLQBDj4Uidqd7z4mBmN3whC85jysSamLl
[69] https://t.me/sprotyv_official/4306
[70] https://t.me/andriyshTime/21210
[71] https://t.me/mod_russia/38041 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/38042
[72] https://www.ukrinform dot ua/rubric-economy/3856851-prezident-pracuemo-z-partnerami-nad-investiciami-u-virobnictvo-zbroi-ta-tehniki-v-ukraini.html ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GAAiF8WJtcc
[73] https://www.facebook.com/rustemumerov.ua/posts/pfbid02kWCypnfspP51vL3PDwjUK8MbV8RdDUMAZ1kvFAyVqf87yDfJvdHqYp2QPo7F5Dpql ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/04/24/rustem-umyerov-peredav-vijskovym-okremogo-shturmovogo-bataljonu-40-broneavtomobiliv-kozak/
[74] https://www.mil.gov
dot
ua/news/2024/04/23/inozemni-investiczii-u-vitchiznyanij-oboronnij-sektor-%E2%80%93-cze-drajver-ekonomiki-derzhavi-%E2%80%93-yurij-dzhigir/
[75] https://armyinform.com
dot
ua/2024/04/26/ukrayina-ta-latviya-vyrishyly-zbilshyty-vyrobnycztvo-droniv/
; https://mfa dot
gov.ua/news/dmitro-kuleba-ukrayina-spilno-z-latviyeyu-naroshchuye-virobnictvo-droniv
[76] https://t.me/Denys_Smyhal/7583 ; https://suspilne dot media/733645-avstralia-gotue-dla-ukraini-novij-paket-dopomogi-na-100-mln-dolariv/ ; https://www.kmu.gov dot ua/news/avstraliia-hotuie-dlia-ukrainy-novyi-paket-dopomohy-kudy-uviidut-drony-ta-pzrk-denys-shmyhal
[77] https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/news/2024/04/minister-blair-announces-additional-military-assistance-for-ukraine-at-the-21st-meeting-of-the-ukraine-defense-contact-group.html
[78] https://www.defensa.gob dot es/gabinete/notasPrensa/2024/04/DGC-240426-reunion-grupo-contacto-ucrania.html; https://mil.in dot ua/uk/news/medykamenty-snaryady-j-rakety-do-patriot-ispaniya-ogolosyla-novyj-paket-vijskovoyi-dopomogy/
[79] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/04/25/daniya-zbilshyt-svoyu-vijskovu-dopomogu-ukrayini-majzhe-na-590-mln-yevro/ ; https://mil dot in.ua/uk/news/daniya-zbilshyla-obsyag-vijskovoyi-dopomogy-dlya-ukrayiny-na-blyzko-590-mln-yevro/ ; https://www.fmn dot dk/da/nyheder/2024/bredt-flertal-af-folketingets-partier-er-enige-om-at-tilfore-flere-midler-til-ukrainefonden/
[80] https://kam dot lt/lietuva-perdave-ukrainai-sarvuocius-m577/ ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/04/23/shhe-odna-partiya-bronetransporteriv-m577-prybuly-v-ukrayinu-yih-peredala-lytva/
[81] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/04/23/lytva-zbyrayetsya-nadaty-ukrayini-radary-ppo/
[82] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/04/23/ukrayina-otrymaye-pershu-partiyu-boyeprypasiv-iz-cheskoyi-inicziatyvy-protyagom-nastupnyh-dvoh-misyacziv/ ; https://www.eeas.europa dot eu/eeas/foreign-affairs-council-press-remarks-high-representative-josep-borrell-after-meeting-13_en
[83] https://brf dot be/national/1824951/; https://mil.in dot ua/uk/news/belgiya-peredast-vynyshhuvachi-f-16-ranishe-a-nizh-planuvala/ ; https://www.newsweek.com/ukraine-receive-expedited-delivery-f16s-1894772 ; https://brf dot be/national/1824951/
[84] https://www.rtbf
dot
be/article/guerre-en-ukraine-invasion-de-l-ukraine-la-belgique-accelere-la-livraison-de-f-16-si-possible-avant-fin-2024-11365690
; https://brf dot be/national/1824951/; https://mil.in dot ua/uk/news/belgiya-peredast-vynyshhuvachi-f-16-ranishe-a-nizh-planuvala/
[85] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/04/29/u-zsu-vidpovily-chy-gotuyetsya-nastup-voroga-na-sumshhyni/ ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Mv6PEi0hRmg
[86] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-28-2024 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/03/12/u-sumskij-ova-prokomentuvaly-informacziyu-pro-novyj-masovanyj-nastup-rosiyan/ ; https://t.me/Sumy_news_ODA/24871
[87] https://www.belta dot by/president/view/lukashenko-podpisal-ukaz-o-prizyve-ofitserov-zapasa-na-voennuju-sluzhbu-631260-2024/; https://president.gov dot by/ru; https://t.me/modmilby/38383
[88] https://t.me/modmilby/38383
